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Abstract 
Using a large matched employer-employee dataset, the authors investigate the relationship between collective 
agreements, wages and restructuring in transition in three former centrally planned economies (Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland). They adopt a natural experiment approach and capture the restructuring process triggered 
by the launch of transition by means of cohort effects among firms founded before or at different stages of this 
process which enable them to control for the heterogeneity of firms in different cohorts. They find that the wage 
premium associated with different levels of collective agreements depends on restructuring and its timing in the 
transition. In early-middle transition firms, industry level agreements protect low skilled wages; whereas in late 
transition ones, firm level agreements increase medium and especially high skilled wages. Some cross country 
differences emerge in the structure of the wage premium as a result of country specific features of restructuring.  
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1 Introduction
Transition to a free market radically changed wage determination in former ‘Socialist economies’.
Compared with West European and Anglo-Saxon models of collective bargaining, in the Socialist
model unions merely sustained a labor market equilibrium with artificially full employment and
compressed wage distributions (Blanchflower and Freeman 1997; Basu et al. 2005). Economic re-
structuring in transition, by which we mean the restructuring of previously state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and the creation of new firms, created productivity gains to be enjoyed by the private
sector. This process had a two fold impact on collective bargaining; on the one hand, the lack of
credibility of the Socialist unions triggered de-unionization and the creation of a large uncovered
sector. On the other hand, the restructuring process encouraged the reform of collective bargaining
institutions in order to foster negotiations between firms and workers over the distribution of the
productivity gains. In two companion papers, Basu et al. (2005), (2004), took a first step to eval-
uate these processes showing that the development of rent-sharing mechanisms between employers
and employees is more effective in newly established firms than in former SOEs in four Central
East European (CEE) countries.
The present paper builds on these insights and makes an original contribution to the literature as
it investigates how restructuring and its timing at different stages during the transition process have
affected the wage premium associated with collective agreements in CEE3. We assess separately the
wage premium for firm and industry level agreements, using non-covered firms in these countries
as a benchmark. The transition process provides the basis for a natural experiment approach as
we treat the restructuring of a firm at a given point of the transition process as its response to an
exogenous shock, namely, the launch of the transition. This approach enables us to control for the
characteristics of firms that determine their bargaining status. Owing to the uneven pace of reform,
the timing of the ’shock’ for different firms and sectors was spread over a ten year period. During
that period, the wage-setting institutions evolved and became more adapted to the workings of
a market economy, and firms which restructured at different stages along this path in effect were
faced with different models. In the early stages, the predominant model was that of industry
bargaining with old-style socialist unions mainly concerned about low skilled wages. As a result
of subsequent changes in labor market institutions, firms which restructured later had additional
2
options including firm-level bargaining which by then had become an effective means of providing
a flexible process of wage determination, advantageous for medium and high skilled workers (EIRO
2002a, 2005; Hancke´ and Kurekova 2008; Blanchflower and Freeman 1997; Boeri and Terrell 2002).
Once they have adopted a bargaining system, firms are often reluctant to switch because of the
investments made in the design of wage-setting arrangements, and the managerial and labor skills
required to operate them, which would need to be made afresh. Thus the regime adopted by a firm
at the moment of restructuring is likely to remain in operation for a considerable period of time.
Our quasi-experimental approach uses restructuring in transition additionally to capture pro-
ductivity differences between firms in their initial conditions and the distribution of efficiency gains
that are unobserved in our data but which potentially influence the wages they pay. The tim-
ing of restructuring is an important indicator also in this respect because in many cases it was
largely correlated with efficiency differences among the individual firms in our sample, and with
internal distributional issues. For example, early restructuring involved many firms that needed
an immediate bail-out because of widespread inefficiencies not anymore covered by governmental
subsidisiation, or it could be the result of factors such as FDI inflows reflecting new market oppor-
tunities seen by foreign firms, and more general exposure to international competition and patterns
of trade liberalization (Hughes and Hare 1994; Estrin et al. 2008; Sacco and Scarpa 2000).
We use a unique cross sectional matched employer -employee dataset for Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Poland (CEE3)1 and deal with restructuring during the transition by means of firm
cohort effects which capture both the establishment of new firms and the complete restructuring
of existing ones.2 Because this information is not readily available in the data, we reconstruct
it from the tenure of workers within the firm3 to distinguish firms established before the launch
of transition (i.e. pre-transition firms) from those established in early-middle transition and late
1The European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) allows us to observe collective agreements long enough after
the launch of transition for a sufficiently stable institutional setting to emerge in these countries. Czech and Hungarian
data are collected in 2002 while Polish data refer to 2004. We thus observe collective bargaining institutions in these
countries respectively 11, 12 and 14 years after the launch of transition. Due to its high degree of cross-country
comparability, ESES data also enable us to carry out the analysis in a comparative perspective.
2For our purposes, the distinction between these two categories is irrelevant, as both ‘de novo’ and fully restructured
old firms reflect the structural change in firms’ internal organization which provides the source of variation we exploit
in the analysis.
3For simplicity of writing, in this paper we use the term ‘firms’ to refer to ‘establishments’ (which are the unit
of analysis of ESES data) rather than units of ownership and control. Moreover many small establishments are also
firms and even more so as a consequence of economic restructuring which led to the disintegration or downsizing of
big firms in smaller operational units.
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transition (see also Sabirianova et al. 2005). Finally, we control for the degree of labor turnover, or
workforce restructuring, among low, medium and high skilled workers in the pre-transition cohort.
We hypothesize that firms characterized by a high turnover of medium and high skilled workers
pursued a fundamental rationalization of key areas of economic activity; conversely those which
only replaced their low skilled labour merely introduced short-run adjustments in the production
process (see Estrin et al. 1995).
Our empirical results confirm that restructuring during the transition exerts a strong influence
on the variation of individual wages associated with different collective bargaining models. We find
that the existence of a wage premium for collective agreements in these former centrally planned
economies critically depends on restructuring and its timing in transition. Although most of the
pre-transition firms are covered by collective agreements, the wage premium is concentrated mostly
in transition firms and presents different features in the two transition cohorts: in early-middle
transition firms collective agreements operate mainly at the industry level and protect low skilled
wages whereas in late transition firms they also operate at the firm level and increase medium and
high skilled wages. Finally, we observe some cross-country differences in the structure of the wage
premium that are to be related to the country specific features of the restructuring process.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the main changes in collective
bargaining during transition in the three countries. In section 3 we present the data with some
descriptive statistics, describe the empirical strategy and the results of the empirical analysis.
Section 4 presents the sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes.
2 Collective Bargaining and Transition
Political and economic turbulence during transition to a market economy have brought about
important changes in collective bargaining institutions in former Socialist economies. Basu et al.
(2004, 2005) describe the typical Socialist model of wage and employment determination as one
characterized by full appropriation of rents by the State which artificially maintains a compressed
wage distribution and ensures full employment in the economy. While this system prevailed in
CEE countries before transition, market liberalization favored the development of new models with
the shift of bargaining power, away from the State and towards firms and workers. The ensuing
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post-transition settings of wage determination in Central Europe differ from country to country
while being based on common broad features.
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have experienced a dramatic decline in unionization,
falling threefold over one decade (Table 1) to levels much lower than in most Western European
countries. Coverage has also declined, from more than 70% at the beginning of 1990s in Poland and
Hungary (55% in the Czech Republic) to below 50% (30% in the Czech Republic). Furthermore,
already at the beginning of 1990s, the three countries were characterized by low levels of central-
ization and coordination of the bargaining process (Table 1). The structure of union coverage has
also changed due to restructuring and the establishment of new enterprises. In general, foreign
investors have not favored collective agreements and workers in firms with foreign capital are much
less likely to be covered, especially in small firms (Gardawski 2002, Kollo and Mickiewicz 2005).
Nevertheless, some multinational enterprises from Western Europe were under pressure to apply to
their CEE subsidiaries the same industrial relations standards they use domestically, thus de facto
exporting models of unionization which prevail in established market economies (Aro et al. 1996,
Hancke´ and Kurekova 2008).
This evolutionary process renders the contemporary system of collective bargaining in CEE
countries quite different from Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Collective agree-
ments are signed mostly at the firm level whereas industry level agreements generally take a multi-
employer form i.e. are signed by employers’ organizations and the relevant trade unions. These
agreements are not subject to extension mechanisms and cover only a small segment of the sector
unless they are signed by employers with a dominant position in the market.4 Accordingly, CEE3
countries present a system where a firm may be covered by an agreement at the industry or the
firm level or may not be covered at all; this makes it possible to compare wage outcomes under
firm-level and industry-level coverage with those in uncovered firms. A similar system is described
by Gu¨ertzgen (2007) for East-Germany in contrast to continental Western Europe where we observe
multiple levels of coverage while extension mechanisms de facto limit the number of workers who
are not covered (Dell’Aringa and Lucifora 1994; Card and de la Rica 2006). It differs also from the
Anglo-Saxon model where we observe either firm level or no coverage (Bryson 2007).
4Conventional sectoral agreements with extension mechanisms analogous to those prevailing in Western Europe,
are generally negotiated by firms that used to be under public control.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and main variables
We use data from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) for the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland.5 This is a matched employer-employee dataset with information on employee
earnings, personal, job and establishment characteristics. Use of shared statistical definitions and
agreed norms of data collection established by Eurostat mean that the data are well suited for
inter-country comparisons. Nevertheless, the average number of observations per establishment
by employment size is substantially higher in the Czech Republic as compared with Poland and
Hungary (see Table 1) due mostly to differences in sampling procedure.6 The Czech, Hungarian
and Polish samples include respectively 1,030,982, 479,009 and 609,764 employee observations for
establishments with 10 or more employees in the manufacturing, construction, trade and service
sectors. For simplicity of exposition, we focus on male full-time employees in private firms in the
manufacturing sector7 and exclude establishments covered by ‘any other type of bargaining’ such
as agreements of individual professional groups that fall within a wide range of economic activities
(Eurostat, 2003). Our final sample includes 203,725 employee observations for the Czech Republic,
26,086 for Hungary and 94,706 for Poland.
Our wage measure relates to gross monthly earnings in the reference month which include
bonuses and exclude overtime pay.8 ESES measures coverage at the lowest level where collective
agreements are signed by the representatives of employers and employees i.e. the level of the firm,
the industry or not signed at all. ESES data do not contain any information on the establishment’s
age, internal organization or labor allocation. We measure restructuring in the transition by means
of two indicators. The first is the cohort to which individual firms belong, based on the date of their
5Remote access to the Czech and Hungarian samples of the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) was
granted by Eurostat within the LEED project, while the Polish Structure of Earnings Survey was made available to
us by the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy; Czech and Hungarian data refer to 2002 while the Polish data
refer to 2004.
6A two stage sampling procedure, of both firms and workers with the firm is carried in Poland and Hungary as
opposed to single stage sampling of firms, with full coverage of workers within the firm in the Czech Republic. We
account for this difference by using sampling weights in the regression analysis.
7The focus on males enables us to avoid a potential bias resulting from the characteristics of women’s labor supply.
In a similar vein we exclude from the sample state owned firms since these may be very different from private firms
in terms of productivity. We also exclude firms in services and construction to minimize the noise due to the creation
of entirely new areas of economic activity during transition in these sectors.
8We preferred a monthly wage to a hourly wage definition (which is the one most widely used in the union
literature) because of a likely problem of under-reporting of actual working hours in the data.
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establishment. We compute this information using the tenure of individual workers within the firm.
In particular, we identify the tenure of the first worker hired by each firm (i.e. the longest tenured
worker within the establishment, LTW ) making the implicit assumption that a firm is established
when its first worker is hired. Next, we use this information to assign each firm to one of three
cohorts, basing on the classification by Sabirianova et al. (2005). In particular, we assign a firm
to a pre-transition cohort of employers if the LTW was hired before the launch of transition (i.e.
before 1990 in Hungary and Poland and 1991 for Czech Republic), a early-middle transition cohort
if the LTW was hired between the launch of transition and 1996 or a late transition cohort if the
LTW was hired after 1996 and before the survey year (i.e. 2002 for Hungary and Czech Republic
and 2004 for Poland).9 Our second measure relates to the extent of workforce restructuring within
pre-transition firms that accompanied the internal reorganizations associated with the transition.
Our measure is based on the proportion of the current workforce that was hired after the transition.
Thus a ’low turnover’ firm undertook relatively little employment restructuring after the transition
and contains a relatively high percentage of its original workforce, whereas a ’high turnover’ one has
a relatively low percentage of its original workforce. To calculate this we identify those workers hired
in the year after the launch of the transition, and compare the proportions of the current workforce
hired before or after this group. We identify three categories of turnover, low, intermediate and
high, for all workers and by skill level. Details are given in Appendix 2.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the average tenure of workers by type of coverage and occupational group. In all
countries, workers in firms which are not covered by any agreement display tenure rates up to 50%
lower than for workers in firms covered by a firm or an industry level agreement (5 years against
8-10 years), this difference being distributed rather uniformly across occupational categories.
The pattern evidenced in Table 3 lends some support to the idea that workers not covered by
any agreement are selected in transition firms. This interpretation is reinforced by evidence in
Table 4, which displays the distribution of workers according to the characteristics of firms in each
9Sabirianova et al. (2005) keep the early cohort distinct from the middle transition one. We merge the two in one
transition cohort to have a higher number of observations in each cohort. However, nothing changes in the results if
we split the transition cohort in the two sub-cohorts (cfr. Section 4).
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cohort. In all countries, pre-transition firms are mostly covered by a collective agreement (mainly
at the firm level) while coverage of transition firms is considerably lower. Interesting cross-country
differences emerge between the two transition cohorts: a relatively high share of late transition
firms in the Czech Republic is covered by firm level agreements; in Hungary the share of covered
workers decreases as we move towards the most recent cohorts while in Poland it remains fairly
stable. Note also that in all countries, transition firms are smaller on average than pre-transition
ones, which is consistent with restructuring in transition being associated with the breaking up of
pre-transition big firms into smaller operational units (Brada et al. 1997; Hughes and Hare 1994).
Finally, sectoral composition, based on an OECD classification of industries by technology regime
(OECD; 2001), shows that the Czech Republic has a greater share of firms in medium-high and
high tech sectors than Hungary and Poland, particularly in the late transition cohort.
3.3 Empirical framework
We investigate the impact of restructuring during the transition on the wage premium associated
with collective agreements by estimating the following model of earnings for worker i at establish-
ment j:
wij = αCOHOj + βCOHOj ∗ AGREE′j + X
′
ijγ + Y
′
jδ + Z
′
jλ+ υij (1)
wij is the log monthly wage of individual i in firm j. COHOj is a vector of dummies for firm j
belonging to the pre-transition, early-middle transition, or the late transition cohort. AGREEj is
a vector of dummies for firm j being covered by a collective agreement at the firm or the industry
level. Vector X includes individual workers’ and job characteristics. Vector Y includes the average
characteristics of co-workers i.e. workers in the same firm and in the same skill group; these capture
unobserved workers’ ability under the assumption that workers with higher unobserved skills tend
to have co-workers with higher average skill levels (see also Card and de la Rica 2006). Finally,
vector Z includes a set of firm characteristics obtained by augmenting the observed information on
the sector and the size of the establishment with those on the restructuring cohort in the transition
and the labor turnover in the pre-transition firms.
8
We add simultaneously in equation (1) the three cohort dummies and their interactions with
AGREE while we omit the constant term. In this way, the estimated βs measure the wage premium
of collective agreements in each cohort while their comparison reveals how restructuring and its
timing in the transition affect the impact of collective agreements on wages. Provided that the set
of ‘restructuring-augmented’ firm characteristics10 accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of firms
in the different cohorts, the OLS produces consistent estimates of the true β coefficients.
We proceed as follows: first, we check for any impact of collective agreements on wages without
considering the effect of the restructuring process reflected by the three cohorts. Then we include
restructuring in the transition by estimating equation (1) on average wages including the cohort
dummies. We finally estimate equation (1) separately for low, medium and high skilled work-
ers in order to check whether collective agreements favor specific groups of workers and whether
restructuring in the transition changes the characteristics of the wage premium by skill group.
3.4 Estimates for average wages
We start by estimating the impact of firm and industry level agreements on average wages without
considering restructuring. We present two sets of estimates: the first includes only controls for
individual and work characteristics (age, tenure, ISCED-education, ISCO-occupation, having a
short-term contract) and the observed firm characteristics (size and NACE2-sector); in the second
set of estimates, we also add the characteristics of coworkers and their interactions. The estimated
coefficients of the collective agreement dummies in Table 5 are never significant (see Table A1 in
Appendix 1 for the coefficients of individual and coworkers characteristics). At a first sight, this
seems to suggest the absence of any impact of collective bargaining on wages in CEE3 in contrast
to the main findings from the union bargaining literature which typically points to the existence
of a wage premium for collective agreements in continental European and Anglo-Saxon countries
(see Bryson, 2007 for a review).
As extensively discussed before, estimates in Table 5 are likely to be biased by firms’ unob-
served heterogeneity; we therefore carry out the analysis considering restructuring in transition
and estimate equation (1). We present three sets of country estimates; each set includes cohort
10This includes over 120 cohort specific sectoral, size dummies and interactions between labor turnover and size.
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specific size and sectoral dummies and controls for individual characteristics and characteristics of
coworkers. In the first set (Table 6, col. [1], [4], [7]) we add only cohort effects. In the second set of
estimates (col. [2], [5], [8]) we add dummies for labor turnover in pre-transition firms. In the third
set (col. [3], [6], [9]) we add interactions between the dummies for labor turnover and firm size.
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of the collective agreement dummies in each cohort
(see Table A2 in Appendix 2 for a discussion of the impact of restructuring in transition on average
wages). A first look at the results reveals that, with respect to the previous estimates, the inclusion
of ‘restructuring augmented’ firm characteristics increases the explained variance of individual
wages as measured by the R2. More importantly, we now find a wage premium of collective
agreements whose magnitude and significance critically depend on restructuring, its timing in
transition and country specific characteristics. In the Czech Republic and Poland there is a strongly
significant wage premium of firm level agreements in late transition firms (of magnitude 18% and
8%, respectively) while there is no evidence of a wage premium in the pre-transition and early-
middle transition cohort. In contrast, in Hungary, we observe a weakly significant wage premium of
firm level agreements (of magnitude 5%-7%) only in the pre-transition and early-middle transition
cohort; we also find evidence of a wage premium for industry agreements in the pre-transition
cohort which disappears however once we add the interactions between labor turnover and size.
3.5 Average wages by skill
Finally we analyze the impact of firm and industry level agreements on average wages by skill
group in the presence of restructuring in transition. Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients of
the collective agreement dummies: for each country, columns [LS], [MS] and [HS] show results
for low, medium and high skilled workers, respectively. The estimated coefficients show that the
premium for firm level agreements previously found in late transition firms in the Czech Republic
and Poland is in fact concentrated among the medium and high skilled workers; Czech estimates
also reveal a wage premium for industry level agreements for the low skilled both in early-middle
and late transition firms which did not emerge from the estimates for average wages. In Hungary,
firm level agreements have a roughly uniform impact on wages along the skill distribution in pre-
transition firms. As in the case of the Czech Republic, in Hungary we also observe a wage premium
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for industry level agreements for the low skilled in early-middle transition firms while we find no
evidence of an impact of collective agreements on wages in late transition firms.
To summarize, estimates by skill group highlight additional features of the wage premium for
collective agreements in CEE3 and its relationship with restructuring in transition; first of all, they
show that in countries where we can compare wage levels under coverage by industry and firm
level agreements with an uncovered sector, the former protect low skilled wages while firm specific
agreements mostly increase medium and high skilled wages. Moreover they confirm the importance
of the timing of restructuring: in fact while in early-middle transition firms’ collective agreements
are most effective at increasing wages when they operate at the industry level, in late transition
firms a new role emerges for firm level agreements. As a relevant exception, in Hungary firm level
agreements already operate in the pre-transition cohort as a likely consequence of a more gradual
transition process.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
We checked the robustness of our results against alternative definitions of restructuring in tran-
sition. For the cohort effect we adopted the exact same definition as Sabirianova et al. (2005)
and mantained the distinction between the early transition cohort of firms (i.e. 1990(1)-1993) and
the middle transition one (i.e. 1994-1996). The results show that the estimated coefficients for
the collective agreement dummies in the two cohorts are not significantly different suggesting that
merging them into a single early-middle transition cohort does not introduce any bias in the result.
Regarding the definition of the thresholds for labor turnover in pre-transition firms, we substituted
the set of dummies for low, medium and high turnover by skill group with just one variable describ-
ing the occurrence of (any level of) labor turnover by skill group. We also modified the definition of
labor turnover to base it on the percentages of workers hired after the launch of transition by skill
group rather than on the position of the transitional worker on the skill specific tenure distribution.
Results once again confirm the robustness of the model specification to the particular definition of
labor turnover.
Finally, we verified the robustness of the results to the inclusion of the information on the
regional location of firms. We thus added 16 regional dummies on NUTS-2 level for Poland, the
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only country for which these data are available. The analysis shows that size and significance of
coefficients for the collective agreement dummies is not affected by the inclusion of local labor mar-
ket effects. Results also show that these have an impact on wages only in the case of metropolitan
areas.11
5 Conclusions
This paper has studied how restructuring in the course of the transition from a centrally planned to
a market economy has affected the wage premium for firm and industry level agreements in Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. We adopted a natural experiment approach and described the
occurrence of restructuring and its timing (in early-middle or late transition) as firms’ responses to
an exogenous shock (i.e. the launch of transition). We built on the idea that collective bargaining
covering a firm which restructured in early-middle or late transition represents a different approach
to industrial relations compared with the collective agreements covering pre-transition firms. Our
approach has also enabled us to neutralize the effect of the heterogeneity among firms (in both
initial conditions and in the distribution of efficiency gains) due to economic restructuring, and
thus to obtain a more accurate measure of the effect of bargaining structure on wages.
Our results contrast sharply with the existing literature on unions and wages highlighting that
the existence of a wage premium for collective agreements in former centrally planned economies
critically depends on the cohort to which firms belong in the restructuring process associated
with the transition. The premium is mostly concentrated in firms of the early-middle and later
transition cohorts; this suggests that bargaining institutions in transition firms may provide workers
with greater power to negotiate compared with their counterparts in pre-transition firms. The
characteristics of the wage premium also differ in the two cohorts: in early-middle transition
firms, industry level agreements are effective and protect low skilled wages. In late transition
firms, firm level agreements play a role as well and increase wages for medium and high skilled
workers. The exception in our study is Hungary, where it is only in pre-transition and early-middle
transition firms that firm level agreements operate, having a roughly uniform impact along the skill
distribution. We interpret this finding as the result of a more gradual process of transition and
11All tables with the detailed results of sensitivity analyses are available from the authors upon request.
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economic restructuring, which started earlier in Hungary than in the Czech Republic and Poland.
A possible caveat for our conclusions is that cohort effects allow us to control for unobserved
heterogeneity of firms in different cohorts but do not allow controlling for firms’ heterogeneity
within each cohort. The use of control functions as in Card and de la Rica (2006) provides a
potentially interesting way to address this issue. Finally notice also that our estimates by skill
suggest a relationship between restructuring in transition, collective agreements and the skill wage
premium which would merit further investigation.
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Table 1: Collective bargaining institutions in CEE countries
union density coverage centralisation coordination
1990 2001 1990s 2002 1990-2000 1990-2000
Czech Republic 78.8 27 55% 21-30% 1 1
Hungary 63.4 (i) 19.9 >70% 31-40% 1 1
Poland 53.1 (ii) 14.7 >70% 41-50% 1 1
Various Sources: CESiFO and ILO databases; ILO World Labor Report;
EIRO 2005; Riboud et al. 2002, Eurostat
iirefers to 1989
irefers to 1995
Table 2: Average number of individual observations within the firm by firm size
no. of employees Czech Republic Hungary Poland
10-49 29 25 22
50-249 155 14 52
250 - 499 329 36 98
500-999 682 75 144
1000 4342 113 253
Total 2349 45 108
Sources: authors’ calculations on SES 2002 data
Table 3: Average workers’ tenure by occupation and type of coverage
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
bargaining coverage industry firm none industry firm none industry firm none
Managers and Techn. 7.8 13.6 7.1 11.9 11.2 6.8 9.7 11.6 6.2
Clerical workers 3.9 10.2 5.2 11.1 8.9 5.5 8.3 9.4 5.2
Service workers 5.0 9.6 3.6 9.3 6.4 3.6 2.1 7.7 3.9
Skilled manuals 7.1 12.1 6.0 9.8 8.9 4.9 9.2 10.3 5.5
Elementary workers 5.7 9.1 5.7 4.2 6.4 3.7 6.9 8.0 4.5
all 5.9 10.9 5.5 9.2 8.4 4.9 8.9 10.3 5.6
Sources: authors’ calculations on SES 2002 data
Occupational categories based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations.
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Table 4: Workforce composition (%) in pre, early-middle and late transitional firms
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
transition cohort pre early-middle late pre early-middle late pre early-middle late
(pre91) (91-96) (97-02) (pre90) (90-96) (97-02) (pre90) (90-96) (97-04)
industry agreement 7.85 15.15 8.05 8.15 2.10 2.59 1.51 0.91 1.58
firm agreement 80.71 27.33 55.48 55.81 27.53 14.83 75.29 37.82 37.44
no agreement 11.44 57.52 36.47 36.04 70.37 82.58 23.2 61.27 60.98
size 10 - 49 4.67 30.46 20.85 10.19 30.50 44.09 5.61 31.08 31.80
size 50 - 249 34.17 47.19 54.15 22.17 29.48 34.60 26.08 41.70 46.31
size 250 - 499 15.03 6.55 10.35 20.03 10.57 10.72 21.59 11.23 10.05
size 500 - 999 23.21 6.90 5.63 22.34 13.29 7.75 20.4 7.32 5.66
size 1000 22.92 8.89 9.02 25.27 16.16 2.84 26.31 8.67 6.18
low, low-medium tech 55.36 55.46 54.53 65.23 53.15 69.04 65.82 77.11 70.88
medium-high, high tech 44.64 44.54 45.47 34.77 46.5 30.96 34.18 22.88 29.13
Observations 173,037 24,835 5,853 11,488 9,694 4,904 43,078 33,758 17,870
% of Obs. 84.94 12.19 2.87 44.04 37.16 18.80 45.49 35.65 18.87
Source: authors’ calculations on SES 2002 data
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Table 5: The impact of collective agreements on average wages
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
firm level -0.050† -0.030 0.022 0.024 -0.007 0.005
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014)
industry level 0.027 0.015 0.009 0.004 -0.023 -0.0016
(0.036) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.050) (0.051)
personal, job ch.∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
sector, size dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
co-workers charact.∗ no yes no yes no yes
Observations 203725 203725 26086 26086 94706 94706
Rsq 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.51
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm; significance levels: † 10%, ∗ 5%, ∗∗ 1%
∗coefficients reported in Table A1.
19
Table 6: The impact of collective agreements on average wages with restructuring in transition
CZ [1] CZ [2] CZ [3] HU [4] HU [5] HU [6] PL [7] PL [8] PL [9]
impact of firm level agreements on wages (in pre, early-middle and late transition firms)
pre -0.031 -0.029 -0.030 0.052 0.054† 0.051† 0.005 0.015 0.017
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
early-middle -0.099∗ -0.100∗ -0.099∗ 0.071 0.067† 0.067† -0.018 -0.018 -0.017
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
late 0.177∗ 0.185∗ 0.181∗ -0.045 -0.046 -0.046 0.085∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.085) (0.088) (0.088) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
impact of industry level agreements on wages (in pre, early-middle and late transition firms)
pre -0.017 -0.020 -0.023 0.071 0.086∗ 0.070 0.062 0.083 0.093
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.076) (0.074) (0.068)
early-middle 0.065 0.066 0.067 -0.083 -0.082 -0.082 -0.127 -0.129 -0.130†
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
late -0.028 -0.010 -0.016 -0.089 -0.090 -0.090 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
(0.164) (0.168) (0.167) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
workers, coworkers yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
cohorti yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
turnoveri no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
nace2*cohort yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
size*cohort yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
size*turnover no no yes no no yes no no yes
Obs 203725 203725 203725 26086 26086 26086 94706 94706 94706
Rsq♦ 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.53
OLS estimates without the constant; standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
♦Rsq refers to the same estimates with the constant (ref. pre - transition firms)
icoefficients reported in Table A2.
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Table 7: The impact of collective agreements on average wages by skill with restructuring in transition
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
LS MS HS LS MS HS LS MS HS
impact of firm level agreements on wages by skill group (pre, early-middle and late)
pre 0.071† -0.022 -0.063 0.079∗ 0.042 0.079∗ -0.048 0.011 0.044
(0.041) (0.027) (0.043) (0.036) (0.030) (0.039) (0.046) (0.025) (0.036)
early-middle -0.085 -0.084∗-0.170∗∗ -0.087 0.090∗ 0.019 -0.028 -0.004 -0.066∗
(0.057) (0.041) (0.057) (0.062) (0.043) (0.049) (0.041) (0.023) (0.033)
late 0.080† 0.195∗ 0.215∗ 0.019 -0.036 -0.066 0.049 0.078∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.043) (0.080) (0.109) (0.067) (0.043) (0.075) (0.040) (0.029) (0.040)
impact of industry level agreements on wages by skill group (pre, early-middle and late)
pre 0.049 0.014 -0.126∗ 0.043 0.079† 0.070 0.112 0.097 -0.080
(0.046) (0.041) (0.050) (0.062) (0.047) (0.072) (0.147) (0.078) (0.059)
early-middle 0.154∗∗ 0.070 0.024 0.173∗-0.004 -0.340∗∗ -0.392∗∗ 0.083 -0.180∗∗
(0.054) (0.057) (0.076) (0.076) (0.050) (0.089) (0.073) (0.079) (0.060)
late 0.260∗∗-0.012 0.074 -0.076 -0.051 -0.255† 0.018 -0.044 0.126
(0.100) (0.152) (0.243) (0.152) (0.060) (0.145) (0.087) (0.061) (0.156)
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
LS: low skilled workers, MS: medium skilled workers; HS: high skilled workers.
21
Appendix 1
Table A1 displays the estimated coefficients for individual characteristics, complementing Table
5. Education, age, tenure and a long-term contract have a positive and significant impact on wages
in all countries. Coworkers’ characteristics (Table A1, col. [2] [4] [6]), reduce the measured effect
of the corresponding individual variables. The negative signs for the shares of women and young
workers signal unobserved skills below average or occupational segregation in less productive firms;
however the positive coefficients (mostly significant) of the interactions with the share of workers
with a university degree also suggests above average unobserved skills of young and female workers
in the presence of a highly skilled workforce.
22
Table A1: The impact of personal, job and coworkers characteristics on average wages (see Table 5)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Intercept 8.868∗∗ 9.294∗∗ 10.987∗∗ 11.131∗∗ 6.323∗∗ 6.615∗∗
(0.060) (0.517) (0.061) (0.226) (0.037) (0.227)
secondary educ. 0.107∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
tertiary educ. 0.385∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.331∗∗ 0.269∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.013) (0.011)
age 0.022∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
age squared 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tenure 0.012∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
tenure squared 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fixed term contract -0.030 -0.023∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.115∗∗
(0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010)
characteristics of coworkers
(%) tertiary educ. 0.103 -0.010 0.208∗∗
(0.119) (0.053) (0.053)
age 0.019 0.002 0.002
(0.021) (0.010) (0.011)
age squared 0.000† 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tenure -0.006 -0.006∗ -0.006∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
tenure squared -0.001 0.000 -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(%) under 30 -0.442∗ -0.073 -0.599∗∗
(0.184) (0.047) (0.169)
(%) over 55 0.468∗∗ 0.081 -0.150†
(0.166) (0.056) (0.089)
(%) females -0.261∗∗ -0.103∗ -0.827∗∗
(0.069) (0.044) (0.140)
(%) fixed term -0.024 -0.065 -0.204∗∗
(0.075) (0.050) (0.035)
fixed term*under 30 0.075 0.022 0.484∗∗
(0.230) (0.079) (0.076)
females*under 30 0.334 -0.023 -0.056
(0.246) (0.100) (0.100)
tertiary educ.*under 30 0.328 0.351∗∗ 0.113
(0.304) (0.094) (0.074)
tenure*over 55 -0.008 0.002 0.036∗∗
(0.010) (0.003) (0.007)
females*tertiary educ. 0.661∗∗ 0.614∗∗ 0.354∗∗
(0.230) (0.155) (0.069)
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm; significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
coefficients in this Table refer to controls in the set of estimates presented in Table 5.
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Appendix 2
Definition of labor turnover (by skill group)
Using the same information on workers’ tenure that enabled us to assign firms to the three
cohorts, we construct a set of variables to gauge the extent of restructuring in pre-transition firms.
We first identify the hires of each firm that occurred in the first year of transition12 (the ‘transitional
workers’) separately for low, medium and high skilled workers (ls, ms and hs); we then locate these
’transitional workers’ within each skill group according to its tenure distribution within each firm.
Next, we define a firm as a ‘low turnover’ one for a given skill group (low, medium, high) if their
‘transitional workers’ in that skill group are all located between the 25th and the 50th percentile
of its skill specific tenure distribution (i.e. if only a minority of workers in that skill group was
hired during transition). We define a firm as an ‘intermediate turnover one’ in a given skill group
if the firm has at least one transitional worker positioned above the median whereas it does not
have any transitional workers positioned above the 75th percentile of the tenure distribution in
the corresponding skill group (i.e. if the majority of workers in that skill group was hired during
transition). Finally a ‘high turnover’ firm in a given skill group has its transitional worker positioned
above the 75th percentile of the skill specific tenure distribution (i.e. almost all workers in that
skill group were hired during transition). This classification assigns to the reference group of firms
characterized by ‘absence of turnover’ those that have their transitional workers positioned just
below the 25th percentile of each (skill specific) tenure distribution thus allowing some rate of
turnover to be ‘natural’ within the firm (e.g. due to workers’ sickness, retirement, death) i.e. not
strictly related to any strategy of employment restructuring.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to capture non-linear returns from alternative
turnover strategies pursued by firms. To give a practical example, a (pre-transition) firm presenting
high turnover for low skilled workers only (i.e. whose restructuring strategy entailed its main
changes in the production process) probably presents different characteristics (in terms of initial
conditions or distribution of efficiency gains) with respect to a firm which introduced a high turnover
of medium and high skilled workers (as this probably carried out a structural restructuring of key
12i.e. a hire occurred in 1990 in Poland and Hungary and 1991 for Czech Republic
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areas of its economic activity).
Cohort effects, labor turnover and average wages
Table A2 extends the set of coefficients presented in Table 6 (obtained from the estimates
on average wages). In more detail, the first set of coefficients (for each country) completes the
results presented in columns [2], [5], [8] - Table 6 referring to estimates that include cohort specific
sectoral and size dummies. The second set of coefficients for each country supplements the results
in columns [3], [6], [9] where we also add interactions between labor turnover and size.
In terms of interpretation, the coefficients of the three cohort dummies compare average wages
paid by (uncovered) firms in each cohort.13 The results show that in the Czech Republic pre-
transition and early-middle transition firms pay higher average wages than late transition ones
(difference significant at 5% level). This is also the case in Poland (particularly for pre-transition
firms) while wage differences between cohorts in Hungary are only weakly significant. This evidence
suggests that, once we control for differences in sector and size within each cohort, productivity
and wages increase with the age of the firm. Moreover the coefficients for labor turnover in pre-
transition firms show that the latter is associated with efficiency gains but these are distributed
unevenly across firm size in each country.14
13After accounting for all other characteristics of firms, workers and coworkers.
14For simplicity, we do not report here the entire set of coefficients, including interactions between labor turnover
and size, which are available from the authors upon request. These suggest that in Czech Republic and (to a lesser
extent) Poland big firms which restructured in transition were probably forced to do so by bad initial conditions (not
yet recovered) as opposed to Hungary where big firms enjoy the main efficiency gains. In all countries medium sized
firms (250-999 employees) enjoy some efficiency gains and these are generally higher in the Czech Republic than in
Hungary and Poland.
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Table A2: Restructuring in transition and average wages (completes Table 6.)
CZ [1] CZ [2] HU [3] HU [4] PL [5] PL [6]
pre ii 9.749∗∗ 9.741∗∗ 10.860∗∗ 10.715∗∗ 7.162∗∗ 7.118∗∗
(0.514) (0.510) (0.213) (0.211) (0.232) (0.228)
early-middle ii 9.736∗∗ 9.752∗∗ 10.889∗∗ 10.886∗∗ 7.053∗∗ 6.978∗∗
(0.514) (0.501) (0.206) (0.205) (0.229) (0.226)
late ii 9.368∗∗ 9.420∗∗ 10.661∗∗ 10.671∗∗ 6.993∗∗ 6.920∗∗
(0.558) (0.562) (0.227) (0.225) (0.235) (0.232)
low turnover of low skilled -0.028 -0.180∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.223 -0.115∗∗ -0.046
(0.055) (0.075) (0.065) (0.188) (0.042) (0.095)
low turnover of medium skilled -0.063 -0.213∗∗ 0.062† 0.181∗∗ -0.037 0.003
(0.042) (0.059) (0.034) (0.061) (0.028) (0.066)
low turnover of high skilled -0.057 -0.239∗∗ 0.048 0.019 -0.175∗∗ -0.189∗∗
(0.043) (0.062) (0.050) (0.093) (0.030) (0.062)
interm. turnover of low skilled -0.067 -0.232∗ 0.057 0.032 -0.058 -0.137∗
(0.063) (0.101) (0.064) (0.097) (0.042) (0.062)
interm. turnover of medium skilled -0.033 -0.087 0.096∗∗ 0.020 -0.043 0.084
(0.053) (0.081) (0.035) (0.069) (0.031) (0.073)
interm. turnover of high skilled -0.016 -0.082 0.041 -0.012 -0.071† 0.041
(0.053) (0.074) (0.044) (0.079) (0.037) (0.076)
high turnover of low skilled -0.064 -0.150† 0.120∗ -0.012 -0.112∗∗ -0.053
(0.064) (0.086) (0.035) (0.076) (0.037) (0.084)
high turnover of medium skilled -0.005 -0.095 0.124∗∗ -0.061 -0.022 0.029
(0.059) (0.086) (0.044) (0.075) (0.029) (0.064)
high turnover of high skilled 0.089 -0.031 0.264∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.032 0.220∗∗
(0.069) (0.086) (0.047) (0.076) (0.045) (0.083)
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by firm: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
coefficients in this Table refer to controls in the set of estimates presented in Table 6.
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